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HIGH SEAS AND HIGH RISKS:  
PROLIFERATION IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 
David G. Hodges∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the biggest threats that the world faces is the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”) and their use by rogue states and 
terrorist groups.1  As the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks proved, 
within the span of a few hours, thousands of people can be killed and the 
direction of the world can be radically changed through the use of 
unconventional weapons and tactics.2  As terrible as the attacks were, 
however, the carnage and consequences of that day would have seemed 
like a mere pittance if certain kinds of WMD were used instead.3 
Ever since chemical weapons were used to devastating effect in 
World War I, nations began employing different tactics to control WMD, 
including legal, political, diplomatic, and military strategies.4  One of the 
                                            
 ∗ David G. Hodges is an attorney at CN Communications, a firm in New York City, 
New York. This Article is dedicated to Alexander and Françoise Gilbert, who made their 
own journey across the sea. 
 1. See Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of 
Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 131, 136 (2005) 
(arguing that the use of a WMD “undoubtedly” threatens world peace and security).  
 2. See Andrew C. Winner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of 
Interdiction, THE WASH. QUARTERLY, Spring 2005, 140 (arguing that the attacks 
reenergized existing efforts to fight WMD proliferation). 
 3. See William Langewiesche, How to Get a Nuclear Bomb, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Dec. 2006, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/12/how-to-
get-a-nuclear-bomb/305402/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (noting that in the first nuclear 
bomb used in the Second World War, “the explosion over Hiroshima yielded a force 
equivalent to 15,000 tons (fifteen kilotons) of TNT, achieved temperatures higher than 
the sun’s, and emitted light-speed pulses of dangerous radiation. More than 150,000 
people died.”). 
 4. See Kevin J. Fitzgerald, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inadequate 
Protection from Chemical Warfare, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 425, 430 (Summer 
1997) (explaining that the 1.3 million casualties of chemical weapons in the First World 
War led to the outlawing of chemical and biological weapons in war with the Geneva 
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latest efforts is the Proliferation Security Initiative (“PSI”), a multilateral 
agreement with more than one hundred nations to facilitate interdictions 
of vessels suspected of carrying WMD5 (a weapon made of nuclear, 
chemical, or biological materials).6  Created by the Bush Administration 
and continued by President Barack Obama, the PSI is both a part of, and 
separate from, the existing anti-proliferation framework7—a fact that 
makes it somewhat controversial, especially when its participants assert 
its most far-reaching powers on the high seas.8  
According to longstanding international maritime law, the seas do 
not belong to any nation and, absent a claim of universal jurisdiction or 
some other exception, it is illegal to board another ship.9  For many 
years, universal jurisdiction could only be exercised to thwart a limited 
number of offenses, none of which are closely related to WMD 
proliferation.10  In response to September 11, however, some states 
pushed to broaden international maritime law to allow states to board 
                                                                                                  
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare). 
 5. Andrew S. Williams, The Interception of Civil Aircraft Over the High Seas in the 
War on Terror, 59 A.F. L. REV. 73, 87 (2007) (explaining that organizing state 
cooperation to stop the proliferation of WMD and its component parts is the goal of the 
PSI). 
 6. See Daniel H. Joyner, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Nonproliferation, 
Counterproliferation, and International Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 507, 511 (2005). 
 7. See generally Craig H. Allen, A Primer on the Nonproliferation Regime for 
Maritime Security Operations Forces, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 51, 54-56 (2007) (explaining 
that nonproliferation “generally refers to the international and national regimes that seek 
to halt and eventually reverse the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems,” 
whereas counter-proliferation “generally refers to the more muscular efforts to prevent 
the movement of WMD materials, technology and expertise from states that fail to 
conform to nonproliferation norms to hostile states and terrorist organizations.”  For the 
purposes of this Article, the Author combines nonproliferation and counter-proliferation 
into “anti-proliferation” to save space and avoid the technicalities attendant to discussing 
the different regimes.); see also Press Release, President Barack Obama, Presidential 
Statement on 10th Anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (May 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210348.pdf. 
 8. John Yoo & Glenn Sulmasy, The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for 
International Cooperation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 414 (2006) (explaining that some 
critics regard it as a facilitator of conflict and a danger to freedom of navigation).  
 9. See Ian Patrick Barry, The Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged 
Vessels on the High Seas Pursuant to Customary International Law: A Defense of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 299, 306 (2004) (explaining that the 
principle of the freedom of the open seas took four centuries to develop). 
 10. See Becker, supra note 1, at 204 (explaining that each universal jurisdiction 
offense has its own history and policy reasons). 
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vessels to stop WMD proliferation.11  The PSI is at the forefront of this 
expansionary effort.12 
This Article considers whether the PSI can be used to expand 
universal jurisdiction to stop WMD proliferation and, if so, whether such 
an expansion is desirable.  Part II provides background information on 
the PSI and past conventions, treaties, and multilateral efforts to stem 
proliferation and delineate maritime jurisdiction.  Part III analyzes the 
ways in which the PSI and its supporting texts affect universal 
jurisdiction.  Part IV offers three recommendations.  First, Part IV(A) 
recommends that universal jurisdiction should expand under the aegis of 
the United Nations.  Second, Part IV(B) argues that if it cannot expand 
under the United Nations, then universal jurisdiction should expand by 
increasing the number of states that belong to the PSI.  Third, Part IV(C) 
proposes that if it cannot expand under the United Nations or by 
increasing the amount of PSI members, then universal jurisdiction should 
expand through unilateral interdictions.  Lastly, Part V of this Article 
advocates that universal jurisdiction on the high seas should be expanded 
to include WMD interdiction.  
II. BACKGROUND 
In May 2003, the PSI was introduced to close loopholes in 
international law and better facilitate the interdiction of WMD, their 
precursors, and related materials.13  The problem with the existing 
framework was illustrated in December 2002, when Spanish naval forces 
on the high seas intercepted the So San, a North Korean ship bound for 
Yemen.14  After searching the ship’s hull, such forces found SCUD 
                                            
 11. Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (arguing that prior to the creation of the PSI 
that the “well established U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation on the high seas 
was at odds with its goal of preventing the proliferation, sale and transport of WMD”). 
 12. See id. (explaining that the impetus for the PSI came after frustration with the 
United Nations due to past ineffectiveness and its institutional aversion to dealing with 
non-state problems). 
 13. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 26, 2005), 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/46858.htm (explaining that the “goal of [the] 
PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing 
proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern”). 
 14. See Joby Warrick, On North Korean Freighter, a Hidden Missile Factory, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at A1 (noting that the Spanish forces first fired warning shots after 
the ship tried to flee and then destroyed the ship’s mast cables so that the forces could 
board). 
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missiles, which are capable of transporting WMD.15  However, although 
the Spanish forces had authority under international law to board the ship 
because it did not display its flag, the naval forces did not have the legal 
authority to seize the missiles or any WMD-related components.16  
The So San incident exposed a problem: How can responsible states 
legally stop the transportation and proliferation of WMD and missiles?17  
Under existing international law, there were a number of treaties, 
resolutions, and agreements that dealt with proliferation, but there was no 
overarching enforcement regime that pulled all of them together.18  In 
response, the United States and an initial group of eleven other countries 
determined to make such a seizure legal so that an incident like the So 
San would not happen again.19  
In order to prevent another So San, the PSI framers took the existing 
legal authorities and used them to create a new framework, one that was 
both multilateral and voluntary in nature.20  Whereas past authorities and 
their enforcement mechanisms, like the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(“NPT”) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”), are 
essentially bureaucratic and closely tied to the United Nations, the PSI is 
more operational and technically outside the existing framework, even as 
it is also in accord with it.21  Termed “an activity, not an organization” by 
                                            
 15. Joyner, supra note 6, at 508 (noting that after calling in American military 
explosives experts, the interdiction revealed that the ship held parts of fifteen SCUD 
missiles, fifteen warheads, and eighty-five drums filled with a chemical used in SCUD 
missile fuel). 
 16. Becker, supra note 1, at 153 (noting that nothing in international law made the 
transport by sea of ballistic missiles or WMD-related materials illegal).  
 17. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 408 (explaining that the boarding was likely 
legal, but that any seizure would be illegal); but see JOHN BOLTON, SURRENDER IS NOT AN 
OPTION, 120-1 (2007) (arguing that seizing the cargo would have been legal because the 
ship was illegally traveling as a commercial vessel, but that someone decided to permit 
the ship to continue its journey due to Yemen’s cooperation in the war on terror). 
 18. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (arguing that the gap that the PSI sought 
to fill permitted WMD proliferation and thus posed a threat to peace and security). 
 19. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that the original PSI core consisted of 
Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and the United States). 
 20. Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE (May 22, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/105213.htm (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2014)  (explaining that the PSI does not replace existing anti-proliferation tools, 
but complements them by closing their loopholes).  
 21. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 410 (arguing that the PSI is built upon the 
political commitment of nations to fight proliferation, which is manifested in bilateral and 
multilateral agreements, as well as by respecting customary international maritime law). 
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one of its supporters,22 the PSI takes its inspiration from international 
law, existing nonproliferation treaties, counter-proliferation agreements, 
and the Law of the Sea Convention (“UNCLOS”).23  In the words of 
former United States National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley:  
[The] PSI is not a replacement for the NPT, the IAEA, or the 
multilateral export control regimes—but a way to build upon 
them and give them a new enforcement mechanism they did not 
have before. In the PSI, cops and criminals do not co-exist in the 
organization. [It] is a group of nations committed to be cops… a 
group that defines criminals clearly… and a group committed to 
hold themselves and each other accountable for results.24 
Today, even “[t]hough the PSI is now a key part of . . . global non-
proliferation efforts,” its members “must [continue to] commit to 
concrete, tangible actions to strengthen the PSI and sustain it as a core 
element of the non-proliferation regime.”25In order to become a member 
of the PSI, a state must follow four interdiction principles, and 
subsequently enforce them through national laws.26  These PSI members 
pledge to give each other the right to search and seize other members’ 
suspect ships, to search suspect vessels that enter their ports and, of 
course, not to trade in WMD.27  The PSI is not part of any particular 
                                            
 22. John R. Bolton, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules 
of the Game in a New Century, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 395, 399 (2005) (arguing that the 
“activity” characterization explains the PSI’s success); see also Becker, supra note 1, at 
148 (explaining that some supporters define it against existing efforts, characterized as 
“bloated, top-heavy international organization[s], whose decision-making capabilities or 
capacity to act are paralyzed by centralization and internal dissent”).  
 23. See Joyner, supra note 6, at 512-17, 525-35. 
 24. Stephen J. Hadley, Former U.S. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Remarks at the Proliferation 
Security Initiative Fifth Anniversary Senior Level Meeting (May 28, 2008), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080528-3.html. 
 25. Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 7.  
 26. Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (providing 
the PSI’s four main interdiction principles: (1) to “undertake effective measures, either 
alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, 
their delivery systems, and related materials; (2) to adopt “streamlined procedures for 
rapid exchange of relevant information”; (3) to review and strengthen both national and 
international authorities to achieve PSI objectives; and (4) to take specific actions to 
interdict WMD, their delivery systems and related materials). 
 27. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 526, 529 (2004) (explaining that the PSI is not just a paper agreement, 
but an effective enforcement mechanism, both through its training exercises and actual 
interdictions). 
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international law, treaty, or organization, but functions with such existing 
laws to “try[] to interdict WMD materials.”28  Accordingly, it is an 
enforcement mechanism that functions mostly independent of the non-
proliferation regime.29  
The legal basis for the PSI comes from a multitude of sources, 
including some that were installed subsequent to its enactment, such as 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.30  Its “authority” 
derives primarily from the NPT, the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
conventions, UNCLOS, and the United Nations.31  These legal 
authorities are, in turn, bolstered by multilateral export control 
agreements, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”) and 
Australia Group.32  To illustrate how these sources interact and the legal 
underpinnings of the PSI, the following is a brief survey of the 
authorities that underlie the PSI and the authorities that have affirmed it 
since its creation.  
A. The Law of the Sea Convention 
Although UNCLOS is not an anti-proliferation treaty, it is crucial to 
the legality of the PSI because it is one of the most widely accepted 
pieces of international law.33  Its authority derives from its codification 
of longstanding maritime law, which existed in one form or another 
                                            
 28. Kyle Mathis, The Nuclear Supplier Group: Problems and Solutions, 4 ALA. C.R. 
& C.L. L. REV. 169, 181 (2013); see also Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/ 
46839.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (explaining that the PSI strives to be consistent with 
national legal authorities).   
 29. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that PSI members need not sign a formal 
agreement or assume legally binding obligations).  
 30.  See U.N. SCOR, 63rd Sess., 4956th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 
2004); see also S.C. Res. 1673, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006) (explaining 
the origins and effect of 1540). 
 31. Joyner, supra note 6, at 512-17, 525-35 (discussing the PSI’s sources and 
influences). 
 32. David S. Jonas, The New U.S. Approach to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty: 
Will Deletion of a Verification Regime Provide a Way out of the Wilderness?, 18 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 597, 645 (2006) (arguing that such efforts are “relative success[es]” in 
preventing WMD-related exports). 
 33. William D. Baumgartner, UNCLOS Needed for America’s Security, 12 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 445, 450-51 (2007-2008) (arguing that by formally acceding to UNCLOS, the 
United States will make the PSI even more powerful due to UNCLOS’s widespread 
acceptance throughout the world).  
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dating back to the medieval period.34  However, despite its widespread 
adherence, some nations, such as the United States, regard it as 
customary international law, making its effect somewhat weaker than it 
would be if the United States were a party.35  A customary law, as 
opposed to a treaty or convention, is a “general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”36  UNCLOS, 
which was signed in 1982, was ratified by 157 nations.37  
The backbone of maritime law is the idea that no nation owns the 
seas, even though a nation may claim some amount of jurisdiction from 
its coastline to the sea.38  Moreover, because the power of the state is at 
its zenith in its own territory, the closer a vessel is to a state the more 
power the state has to assert over the vessel.39  To that end, there are four 
classifications of a state’s jurisdiction under UNCLOS.40  First, the 
                                            
 34. Joyner, supra note 6, at 526 (“The evolution of [the law of the sea] has continued 
through to modern times, and in the twentieth century it has [been] codified . . . in a 
number of significant multilateral treaties as well as through the rule-generating 
processes of customary international law.”).  
 35. Baumgartner, supra note 33, at 449-51 (arguing that acceding to a treaty is better 
than customary law because it makes interpretation much easier by clearly delineating the 
terms of the agreement rather than leaving them subject to interpretation). 
 36. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & SEAN D. MURPHY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 21 (West Publishing Co. 2002) (1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987)) (explaining that a law 
becomes customary both out of widespread adherence and the fact that states regard it as 
obligatory). 
 37. Joyner, supra note 6, at 526-27 (explaining that the main reason why the United 
States has refused to sign UNCLOS—its regulation of the deep sea bed—is unrelated to 
the parts of UNCLOS that are relevant to the PSI). 
 38. Barry, supra note 9, at 307 (commenting that the hugely influential Dutch jurist, 
Hugo Grotius, formulated the idea that because the sea belongs to every state, no state 
can claim it as that state’s exclusive property); see also Williams, supra note 5, at 94 
(providing that this “paramount” principle ensures the mobility of United States forces in 
times of war and peace).  
 39. Jonathan C. Thomas, Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 579, 604 (2005-
2006) (explaining that a state’s power decreases as the distance from the state’s coastline 
increases). 
 40. See Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, supra 
note 26 (Section 4(d) of the PSI, which parallels UNCLOS’s classification of the 
territorial and contiguous seas, allows PSI members to take “appropriate actions” to: (1) 
“stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when 
declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states 
or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified”; 
and (2) “to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or 
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring 
that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to 
entry.”). 
196 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2 
 
territorial sea, which extends twelve nautical miles from a state’s coastal 
territory, represents the greatest assertion of a state’s power.41  Second, 
the contiguous sea, which extends for twelve nautical miles from the 
territorial sea, is territory within which a state may enforce its laws.42  
Third, the exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), which extends 200 nautical 
miles from a state’s coastal territory, grants a state limited jurisdiction to 
conduct scientific research and to use and protect the marine 
environment.43  Lastly, the high seas constitute an area over which no 
state can exercise jurisdiction, absent a claim of universal sovereignty.44 
A corollary to maritime jurisdiction is that a flag state has exclusive 
jurisdiction over its vessel, meaning that a flagged vessel is akin to a 
floating piece of a state’s territory.45  However, this principle is not 
inviolable, because both international law and UNCLOS recognize that 
sovereignty is not an end in itself and that some offenses require a breach 
of sovereignty.46  
To that end, under Article 110 of UNCLOS, a state has universal 
jurisdiction over a flagged vessel if it is reasonably suspected of one of 
the following actions: (1) sailing without a nationality, (2) engaging in 
piracy, (3) trading in slaves, or (4) participating in unauthorized 
broadcasting.47  These exceptions are essentially the only instances 
where maritime law grants a nation the power to interdict another 
nation’s ship on the high seas.48 
                                            
 41. John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations, 
42 A.F. L. REV. 119, 129 (1997) (explaining that states have the most rights in the area 
closest to shore). 
 42. Jeremy Rabkin, How Many Lawyers Does It Take to Sink the U.S. Navy?, THE 
WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 10, 2007, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/ 
Articles/000/000/014/052guyna.asp (explaining that in exchange for these benefits a state 
consents to give other states “innocent passage” through its waters). 
 43. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 73, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (stating that coastal states have the right to enforce their laws). 
 44. Williams, supra note 5, at 94 (noting that the seas are open to any vessel engaged 
in a lawful purpose). 
 45. See Barry, supra note 9, at 305 (providing that freedom of navigation is the 
“hallmark principle” of the law of the sea). 
 46. Becker, supra note 1, at 203-204 (explaining that certain offenses are so great that 
they affect all nations and, therefore, give all nations a license to stop them). 
 47. Sandra L. Hodgkinson et al., Challenges to Maritime Interception Operations in 
the War on Terror: Bridging the Gap, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 583, 591-92 (2007) 
(explaining the limited exceptions to freedom of navigation). 
 48. Id. at 592 (noting the belligerent right of visit and search, not relevant for this 
treatment, where if a warship in an armed conflict reasonably suspects a foreign-flagged 
vessel of supplying weapons, then it may stop and search that vessel). 
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B. The Preexisting Anti-Proliferation Framework 
In order to explore the different regimes and enforcement 
mechanisms for WMD, the following section examines nuclear, 
chemical, and biological anti-proliferation efforts. 
1. Nuclear Anti-Proliferation Efforts 
After the United States detonated two atomic bombs over Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, states sought to control the awesome power of atomic 
energy.49  The most notable effort, the NPT, was signed in 1968 to fight 
nuclear proliferation and reduce Cold War tensions attendant to nuclear 
weapons.50  The NPT delineated a framework through which states could 
encourage peaceful nuclear development, manage the disarmament of 
nuclear weapons, and thwart the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
their related technologies.51  Under the NPT, parties are forbidden from 
transferring nuclear weapons or explosives to any state, and from 
assisting or inducing any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or 
acquire nuclear weapons or explosives.52  There are 189 signatory states 
to the NPT.53 
The NPT is enforced by the IAEA, which verifies compliance with 
its safeguards and detects diversions of nuclear technology for non-
peaceful purposes.54  In theory, if the IAEA discovers that a state 
violated the NPT then the matter is referred to the United Nations 
Security Council, which may then decide to exercise its power under 
                                            
 49. Michael Elliott et al., Living Under the Cloud, TIME, Aug. 1, 2005 (stating that the 
detonation of the bombs over Japan “forever serv[ed] as an admonishing reminder of 
mankind's destructive capacities”). 
 50. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/ 
Nuclear/NPT.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (describing how the NPT was introduced 
in 1968, came into force in 1970, and was extended indefinitely in 1995).  
 51. Joyner, supra note 6, at 512 (noting that alongside the development of the most 
destructive weapons were regimes to limit their development and usage). 
 52. Allen, supra note 7, at 58 (pointing out that the global inventory of nuclear 
weapons exceeds 10,000 despite sustained efforts to reduce it). 
 53. Id. at 59 (noting that the only states not party to the NPT are India, Israel, 
Pakistan, and North Korea). 
 54. Taylor Burke, Nuclear Energy and Proliferation: Problems, Observations, and 
Proposals, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18-19 (2006) (noting that the IAEA’s goal is to 
promote nuclear safety, security, science, and technology). 
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Chapter VI or VII.55  However, occasionally one of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, China, or Russia) vetoes a Security Council resolution, leaving 
the NPT unenforced and the violator unpunished.56  
In 1975, in response to India’s detonation of a nuclear bomb, a group 
of fifteen nations sought additional means to enforce the NPT through 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”), a voluntary multilateral export 
control regime.57  Because the test showed that nuclear technology used 
for peaceful purposes could be used to create a weapon instead, NSG 
supplier states sought to prevent such misuse by implementing 
proliferation safeguards in their domestic laws.58  Although the NSG is 
not formally part of the NPT, its members help enforce the NPT through 
a set of guidelines and trigger list to control the export of nuclear 
weapons and their component materials.59  If any item from the trigger 
list is exported, then both the NSG and the NPT are implicated.60  The 
list was expanded to include dual-use materials in 1992 after many 
essential components of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program were 
discovered to have originated through legitimate commerce.61  
2. Chemical and Biological Anti-Proliferation Efforts 
The Biological Weapons Convention (“BWC”), founded in 1972, 
came out of existing efforts to ban biological weapons after their use in 
                                            
 55. Allen, supra note 7, at 58-60 (stating that although North Korea was party to the 
NPT for many years, when it withdrew in 2003 the effect was mostly symbolic as it 
flouted the treaty for years).  
 56. Harold Brown, New Nuclear Realities, WASH. Q., Winter 2007-2008, at 7, 12 
(explaining that a state may remain in compliance with the NPT while developing nuclear 
power until it reaches a stage when it can withdraw from the NPT and rapidly develop a 
nuclear weapon, as was the case with North Korea).  
 57. Kate Heinzelman, Towards Common Interests and Responsibilities: The U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Deal and the International Nonproliferation Regime, 33 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 447, 454 (Summer 2008) (providing that India’s detonation led to the NSG and 
an export control policy for nuclear materials). 
 58. See generally History of the NSG, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG), 
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/ Leng/01-history.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 59. Becker, supra note 1, at 138-39 (explaining that the NSG supplements the NPT by 
limiting exports to proliferators). 
 60. Allen, supra note 7, at 61-62 (explaining that a suspect export triggers the NPT 
safeguards, which are set by the IAEA). 
 61. Joyner, supra note 6, at 516 (noting that legitimate commercial transactions of 
dual-use materials were among the “greatest facilitator[s]” of the Iraqi nuclear weapons 
program). 
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World War I.62  The BWC’s goal is to stop the use, development, 
production, and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons through 
their destruction.63  Unlike the NPT, it does not have a formal 
enforcement mechanism, but relies on its signatories to recognize the 
legally binding nature of the agreement.64 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (“CWC”) is newer than the 
BWC and NPT, but its mission is similar.  Founded in 1993, the CWC 
forbids its members from developing, producing, maintaining, or using 
chemical weapons, and from permitting their use in any area under a 
state’s control.65  Also like the BWC, the CWC does not have an 
enforcement bureaucracy such as the IAEA, but it does employ 
international organizations to carry out its mission.66  Although 
violations of the CWC can ultimately be reported to the United Nations 
Security Council, its enforcement mechanisms are mostly dependent 
upon states implementing their own anti-chemical weapons legislation.67  
The Australia Group has a similar relation to the BWC and CWC, as 
the NSG has to the NPT.68  As with the NSG, the Australia Group is a 
voluntary group of forty like-minded states that seek to stem proliferation 
and do so by coordinating their laws and national export regimes.69  
Founded in 1985 after the discovery that chemical weapons used in the 
Iraq-Iran War partially originated through legitimate trade channels, the 
                                            
 62. Biological Weapons Convention, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
t/isn/bw/ (last visited Jan 19, 2014). 
 63. Id. (noting that the convention strives, in part, to lessen the horrors of war). 
 64. Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: The 
Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 271, 273-74 (2007) 
(arguing that the use of hard, legal language and soft enforcement language leads to 
problems in interpreting and enforcing the BWC).. 
 65. Allen, supra note 7, at 65 (explaining that the CWC originated in the 1925 Geneva 
Gas and Bacteriological Warfare Protocol). 
 66. See Thomas D. Lehrman, Enhancing the Proliferation Security Initiative: The 
Case for a Decentralized Nonproliferation Architecture, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 239 
(explaining that centralizing anti-proliferation regimes within the United Nations helps 
reduce costs and harmonize the international legal system).. 
 67. See Allen, supra note 7, at 65; see also About the CWC, U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
CONVENTION, http://www.cwc.gov/CWC_about.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) 
(explaining that in the United States, for instance, American companies “engaged in 
activities involving these chemicals may be required to submit declarations and/or reports 
to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and may be subject to inspection by the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which administers the CWC”). 
 68. Allen, supra note 7, at 68 (noting that the CWC requires its signatories to employ 
export controls through its national laws). 
 69. Christopher A. Ford, The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of 
Nonproliferation Regimes, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 937, 973 (2007). 
200 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2 
 
Australia Group’s goal is to prevent legal proliferation by harmonizing 
national export controls for chemical and biological weapon precursors.70  
Its members meet regularly to ensure that member industries do not 
export chemical and biological weapon precursors, or dual-use chemical 
and biological weapon materials.71 
C. The United Nations 
Along with the general mandate from existing treaties and 
frameworks, the PSI also derives authority from the United Nations72  In 
particular, both the 1992 Presidential Statement and United Nations 
Security Counsel Resolution 1540 are key authorities: the statement 
declared that WMD proliferation is a global threat, and the resolution 
mandated that all states must prevent WMD proliferation to terrorists.73  
The resolution, which the Security Council unanimously passed on April 
26, 2004, and reaffirmed with Resolution 1673 on April 27, 2006, 
established three objectives.74  First, it affirmed and updated the NPT, 
CWC, and BWC.75  Second, it required all United Nations members “to 
punish any ‘non-[s]tate actors’ dealing in weapons of mass destruction 
and technology.”76  Third, it required that all members institute effective 
laws that “prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist 
purposes.”77  
                                            
 70. The Origins of the Australia Group, THE AUSTRALIA GROUP, 
http://www.australiagroup.net/en/origins.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Becker, supra note 1, at 148-49 (explaining that the United States welcomes 
United Nations support for the PSI even though the initiative is separate from the 
international body). 
 73. Id.; see also Proliferation Security Initiative Fact Sheet: Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm (last visited Jan. 
19, 2014) (stating that the PSI is “consistent” with the 1992 statement).  
 74. S.C. Res. 1673, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1673 (Apr. 27, 2006) (reaffirming and re-
endorsing 1540). 
 75. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (explaining that all 
parties should fulfill their obligations within the existing framework).. 
 76. U.N. Security Council Unanimously Passes Resolution on WMD, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2004/04/20040428173143 
frllehctim0.7385828.html#axzz2t38o9fZO (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). 
 77. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 18 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004) (explaining that this 
must be done through export controls and other methods to prevent WMD acquisitions). 
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In addition to its affirmations and requirements, 1540 universalized 
the anti-proliferation system.78  Although the treaties detailed above are 
only as strong as the states that are party to them, 1540 bound every 
United Nations member to fight proliferation.79  Accordingly, by creating 
a legally binding resolution in which all states are responsible for 
implementing anti-proliferation laws, 1540 made the PSI more powerful 
than it would be as a multilateral agreement.80 
III. ANALYSIS 
In October 2003, nearly a year after the North Korean incident, the 
PSI had its most notable success when it interdicted a German-flagged 
ship, the BBC China, on its way to Libya.81  As a result of international 
cooperation between the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and 
Italy, the ship was diverted to an Italian port where thousands of parts of 
uranium enrichment equipment were discovered in its hull.82  In contrast 
to the So San incident, the BBC China interdiction was grounded in 
international law and, more importantly for PSI advocates, the 
interdiction seemed to vindicate its mission.83  By interdicting the ship, 
the PSI proved its worth and effectiveness.84  Even more importantly, 
because the interdiction happened in Italy’s territorial sea and the 
                                            
 78. Joyner, supra note 6, at 539 (arguing that 1540 improved the existing anti-
proliferation system by making it applicable to all states). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. (“Resolution 1540 addressed these challenges through the authority of the 
Security Council under its Chapter VII power, binding upon every [United Nations 
member] under Article 25 of the [United Nations] Charter. Through this legally binding 
decision, the Security Council imposed additional continuing international legal 
obligations on all [United Nations] member states.”); see also John Bolton, An All-Out 
War on Proliferation, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 7, 2004), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/36035.htm (arguing that 1540 burdens all states with the legal 
obligation to fight proliferation). 
 81. Becker, supra note 1, at 155. 
 82. Samuel E. Logan, The Proliferation Security Initiative: Navigating the Legal 
Challenges, 14 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 274 (2005) (describing the BBC 
China interdiction as the PSI’s most prominent achievement, because it showed that the 
PSI could operate consistent with international law while simultaneously fighting 
proliferation effectively). 
 83. Becker, supra note 1, at 156 (noting that shortly after the BBC China interdiction, 
Libya renounced its weapons programs); see also Bolton, supra note 22, at 401 (arguing 
that the interdiction also helped dismantle the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear 
proliferation network). 
 84. See Byers, supra note 27, at 529. 
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vessel’s flag state gave permission for its search, the interdiction was 
legal.85  
But suppose there was a different situation, in which a non-PSI state, 
to circumvent international law, transferred a WMD to another non-PSI 
state.  Ostensibly, if the vessel stayed in friendly waters, flew a flag, and 
was not reasonably suspected of a universal jurisdiction offense, it could 
travel unmolested and deliver the WMD.86  Although the PSI sought to 
close existing loopholes in the anti-proliferation system and the BBC 
China was clearly a success, it is less clear that the PSI can stop this 
hypothetical situation.87 
To address such a situation, this section analyzes how well the PSI 
closed such loopholes.  First, it provides a side-by-side comparison 
between the PSI and UNCLOS.  Second, it measures how well the PSI 
compares to the preexisting anti-proliferation regime.  Third, it examines 
the PSI’s effectiveness following the passage of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540.  
A. The Law of the Sea Convention Provides Only a Limited Basis for 
Universal Jurisdiction 
In addressing UNCLOS’s limitations, the PSI makes some 
improvements by committing nations to making proliferation a universal 
jurisdiction offense.88  In particular, having over one hundred states 
either to sign the PSI or support some kind of anti-proliferation effort is a 
major accomplishment toward making WMD proliferation a universal 
jurisdiction offense.89  Moreover, the significant amount of PSI 
membership satisfies the first requirement of customary law—that the 
custom is generally, if not universally, practiced.90 Accordingly, if more 
                                            
 85. Bolton, supra note 22, at 400 (attributing the PSI’s success, in part, to its “ample 
authority to support interdiction actions at sea, in the air, and on land.”); see also Byers, 
supra note 27, at 529 (noting that the legality of the BBC China interdiction was 
undisputed). 
 86. See Byers, supra note 27, at 527. 
 87. See Becker, supra note 1, at 155 (explaining that the success of the BBC China 
operation was due, in part, to not rocking the international law boat). 
 88. Hadley, supra note 24 (explaining that the PSI deputizes states to fight 
proliferation by using their own resources and ingenuity).  
 89. See Proliferation Security Initiative 10th Anniversary High Level Political 
Meeting Outcomes, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 28, 2013), 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210010 (recognizing “the critical role the [PSI] has 
played in countering the spread of [WMD]”). 
 90. See Barry, supra note 9, at 301 (defining customary international law as a 
generally accepted state practice). 
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states agree to interdict proliferators, then that practice may eventually 
become generally accepted and, therefore, satisfy the second requirement 
of international customary law.91  
However, the great number of PSI participants can be misleading.92  
Although strong membership is beneficial in theory, especially 
considering that it constitutes over sixty percent of global, commercial 
shipping tonnage, the problem remains that non-signatory states are the 
ones most likely engaged in proliferation.93  Additionally, without 
violating one of UNCLOS’s four exceptions under Article 110, a rogue 
state can still proliferate to another with impunity.94  In this way, a state 
can transport dual-use materials intended for WMD construction, even 
though it is technically not breaking the law.95 
In essence, UNCLOS’s interdiction power is significantly limited; 
states do not have the legal authority to board a vessel suspected of 
proliferation unless: (1) the vessel’s flag state gives permission to board, 
or (2) the vessel is reasonably suspected of violating Article 110.96  
Moreover, the flag states that are likely to proliferate are also unlikely to 
permit other states to search their vessels, let alone to grant the power to 
seize their cargo.97 
Further, although UNCLOS already has the force of customary 
international law, none of the four instances in which a state may breach 
another state’s sovereignty is closely related to the interdictions 
envisioned by the PSI.98  Instead, these exceptions reflect the widely 
                                            
 91. Id. at 302; but see Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary 
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (Fall 1999) (explaining that it is 
unclear how a state practice becomes a custom because questions remain as to how many, 
and how consistently, states must follow the practice). 
 92. Becker, supra note 1, at 164-65 (noting that China, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia 
are not PSI members, which is problematic due to their influence in southeast Asia). 
 93. See Brown, supra note 56, at 7 (explaining how North Korea exploited the law to 
“legally” develop a nuclear weapon); see also Proliferation Security Initiative Boarding 
Agreement with Cyprus, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 25, 2005), http://m.state.gov/ 
md50274.htm (noting that a large percentage of vessels may be subject to several 
boarding, search, and seizure protocols).  
 94. Becker, supra note 1, at 203-204. 
 95. See Henry Sokolski, Nukes on the Loose, WKLY. STANDARD, June 23, 2003, at 20 
(noting that Iran did not violate the NPT in most of its covert acquisitions). 
 96. See UNCLOS, arts. 95-96 (explaining that warships and vessels conducting 
governmental, non-commercial services are immune from interdiction).  
 97. Byers, supra note 27, at 531. “The problem with all the treaty-based approaches is 
that the states most likely to traffic in WMD and associated technologies are unlikely to 
accord stop-and-search powers to other states.”  Id. 
 98. Joyner, supra note 6, at 532 (arguing that efforts to expand the definition of piracy 
to include WMD trafficking are unsuccessful due to their “total implausibility”).  
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agreed-upon offenses during UNCLOS’s ratification.99  For example, the 
BBC China operation, which stopped nuclear components from being 
delivered to a state sponsor of terrorism, likely has more resonance post-
9/11 than in 1982, when UNCLOS was ratified.100  Accordingly, that 
operation, which was completed pursuant to the PSI, would likely not 
have been successful were it justified solely on Article 110.101  It follows, 
by extension, that if terrorist operations were attempted on the high seas, 
where such authorities’ power is more attenuated, then the likelihood of 
success would be even smaller.102 
A proponent of using UNCLOS to expand universal jurisdiction 
might point to Article 110, which, in prefacing these exceptions, states 
that they apply “[e]xcept where acts of interference derive from powers 
conferred by treaty.”103  It stands to reason then, that the PSI, as an 
extension of the anti-proliferation regime, is part of that conferred 
power.104  However, being part of that power simply gives a state the 
ability to rewrite its treaty obligations, rather than UNCLOS itself.105 
Simply put, though the PSI is complementary of, and mindful of, the 
place of UNCLOS, it cannot really be used to expand universal 
jurisdiction.106  At best, the ways in which UNCLOS itself became 
customary international law, through widespread adherence and the 
                                            
 99. Becker, supra note 1, at 204. 
 100. Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and 
Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 257, 258-59 (Winter 2002) 
(explaining that some early drafts of UNCLOS defined “piracy” to include only 
commerce, and not political acts, which might be defined as terrorism today).  
 101. Becker, supra note 1, at 204 (stating that “[u]nless proliferation actors engage in 
piracy to facilitate the trafficking of dangerous materials, or if the trafficking somehow 
involves manifestations of the modern slave trade (e.g., trafficking in sex workers), these 
clear expressions of legal authority to override the non-interference principle on the high 
seas will not have direct application”). 
 102. Tara Helfman, The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of 
the West African Slave Trade, 115 YALE L.J. 1122, 1154 (Mar. 2006) (noting that 
UNCLOS does not even prohibit non-contraband weapons). 
 103. UNCLOS, arts. 95-96 (delineating the circumstances in which a vessel has the 
right of visit); see also Joyner, supra note 6, at 537 (explaining that “the drafters of 
Article 110 wished to leave open the possibility that subsequent or already extant treaties 
among groups of [UNCLOS] signatories might amend as among themselves the right of 
interdiction covered in Article 110”). 
 104. Byers, supra note 27, at 527 (noting that a state can give another state permission 
to exercise jurisdiction over its vessel). 
 105. Id. at 537 (noting that states can modify Article 110’s provisions simply by 
creating “conflicting principles in other treaty instruments”). 
 106. Helfman, supra note 102, at 1154.  UNCLOS is silent as to intercepting non-
contraband weapons.  Id. 
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passage of time, can serve as a model for the PSI and the goal of 
expanding universal jurisdiction.107 
B. The Preexisting Anti-Proliferation Framework Inadequately 
Addresses High Seas Proliferation 
Before the PSI’s creation, the global anti-proliferation system had 
mixed success.108  Although the system developed alongside WMD 
technology, it did not always meet the challenge of anti-proliferation.109  
Indeed, rather than taking a proactive role in preventing WMD 
development, the system was more often reactive and responsive—
dealing with WMD after their use rather than before their creation.110 
To some degree, this was understandable.  Nations jealously guard 
and heavily protect their defense secrets, particularly when weapons are 
built in response to a real or perceived national security threat.111  In 
addition, due to the complexities and suspicions associated with 
international relations, an intrusive system faces many obstacles when it 
tries to prevent a state from acquiring weapons that the state perceives as 
necessary for its national security.112  Moreover, opposing parties are 
deeply divided, distrustful, hostile, and share little common ground with 
each other, such as the case of Iran and the U.S.-led negotiating 
parties.113  In this context, stopping or even deterring proliferation is a 
difficult and complicated pursuit.114 
                                            
 107. See generally, Barry, supra note 9, at 306-309 (explaining that the law of the sea 
developed over a period of four centuries with the help of scholars, treaties, and state 
practice). 
 108. Allen, supra note 7, at 57 (arguing that, for some critics, the preexisting anti-
proliferation regime has always been, and will remain, ineffective in stopping or deterring 
the use of WMD by rogue states or terrorist groups). 
 109. Heinzelman, supra note 57, at 451 (explaining that in the context of nuclear 
weapons, “proposals for an international nonproliferation system have vacillated between 
emphasizing arms control and arms oversight”). 
 110. John R. Bolton, Conversations with the Forum: Perspectives on Preemption and 
National Security: Interview with Under Secretary of State John R. Bolton, 29 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 5, 7 (Winter 2005) (arguing that the existing framework passively and 
inadequately dealt with the precursors to WMD). 
 111. Joyner, supra note 6, at 525-26. 
 112. Id. at 512 (explaining that during the Cold War, the superpower rivalry between 
the U.S. and Soviet Union spurred “almost unbridled development” of WMD programs). 
 113. Geoffrey Kemp, Desperate Times, Half Measures, THE NAT’L INTEREST (June 1, 
2005), http://nationalinterest.org/article/desperate-times-half-measures-558. 
 114. When the Soft Talk Has to Stop, The ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/5382479 (noting that if a rogue state fully masters the 
enrichment process, “the only bar to a military program[] is intent”). 
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Despite these caveats, however, there is ample room for criticizing 
the pre-PSI anti-proliferation system.115  In addition to the general bar 
against the transfer and development of nuclear weapons, the NPT gives 
its signatories the “inalienable right” to “develop research, produc[e] and 
use [] nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”116  In theory, because of the 
significant number of states that are part of the NPT, which has been 
ratified by more states than any other similar agreement, it should be an 
effective tool of the anti-proliferation system.117  In practice, however, its 
provisions have little effect, absent compliance.118   
In particular, the NPT’s biggest loophole is that a state can act 
entirely consistent with the NPT to develop a nuclear weapon by legally 
obtaining most of the component parts necessary to build a weapon and 
then opting out of the NPT when it is time to actually build the 
weapon.119  In this way, a state can act “legally” as a party to the NPT to 
develop a nuclear weapon and, thereafter, as a non-party to the NPT and 
possess such a weapon.120  In addition, the NPT does not provide for the 
universal interdiction of a state for nuclear weapon proliferation.121  
                                            
 115. Winner, supra note 2, at 130 (arguing the PSI responds to a new threat that cannot 
be addressed just by the NPT); see also Amitai Etzioni, Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament, 
THE NAT’L INTEREST (Dec. 1, 2004) http://nationalinterest.org/article/enforcing-nuclear-
disarmament-510. 
 116. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. 4, July 1, 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT] (noting that the “peaceful purposes” 
right is subject to compliance with the NPT’s requirement not to manufacture or transfer 
a nuclear weapon). 
 117. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/ 
NPT/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (characterizing the amount of NPT 
signatories as “a testament to the Treaty’s significance”); but see Brown, supra note 56, 
at 18 (arguing that the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament since the NPT was ratified 
has hindered anti-proliferation efforts); see also Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Nuclear 
Insecurity, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sept. 2007) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
62832/wolfgang-k-h-panofsky/nuclear-insecurity (noting that several NPT states are 
trying to obtain nuclear weapons, and four nuclear weapons states (India, Israel, Pakistan, 
and North Korea) are not parties to the treaty). 
 118. Becker, supra note 1, at 138; see also Elliott, supra note 49 (commenting that 
none of the 1968 nuclear signatories intended to abide by their promise to completely 
disarm their nuclear weapons). 
 119. Brown, supra note 56, at 12. 
 120. Becker, supra note 1, at 139; see also Joyner, supra note 6, at 517 (explaining the 
difficulty of determining which technologies are dual-use where, for example, a civilian 
space missile program is almost indistinguishable from a military missile program until it 
is almost fully complete). 
 121. Adam Treiger, Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing Nuclear-
Expertise Proliferation, 82 GEO. L.J. 237, 258 (1993). 
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Indeed, under the NPT, proliferating nuclear material to a terrorist group 
“is in effect legal.”122 
The Chemical and Biological Weapons conventions share many of 
the NPT’s limitations.123  The conventions, like the NPT, are only as 
powerful as the number of states that are adhere to and willingly comply 
with them.124  Although states adhere to the conventions in different 
ways, their best chance of success is through informal groups, like the 
Australia Group, which has produced “mixed” results.125 
In contrast, the PSI helps guard against proliferation by raising its 
costs and reducing the amount of states through which materials can be 
inadvertently proliferated.126  Moreover, as the NPT essentially permits 
proliferating nuclear material to a terrorist group, the PSI hinders such 
proliferation by drying up the ways in which it can be proliferated.127  
Although this prevention is limited to PSI states, it makes the ocean ways 
less amenable to potential proliferators both by reducing the amount of 
friendly parties who can assist such proliferation efforts, and by setting a 
precedent, not only by law or agreement, but also by enforcement.128 
In measuring the value of the anti-proliferation regimes, it is also 
useful to compare the PSI to the NSG and Australia Group because they 
each attempt to tackle the limitations of the preexisting system.129  The 
PSI, similar to the NSG and Australia Group, complements the 
preexisting system by creating a framework through which states can 
voluntarily close loopholes in the regime.130  Additionally, unlike the 
older anti-proliferation regimes, PSI participants do not have legally 
binding responsibilities.131  This, in turn, facilitates the unilateral anti-
                                            
 122. Etzioni, supra note 115. 
 123. Allen, supra note 7, at 66. 
 124. Nobuyasu Abe, Existing and Emerging Legal Approaches to Nuclear Weapons in 
the 21st Century, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 929, 931 (Summer 2007) (arguing that 
“[t]he basic weakness of most methods based on joining like-minded countries together is 
that participation and compliance are essentially voluntary”). 
 125. Becker, supra note 1, at 138. 
 126. Ford, supra note 69, at 589. 
 127. Etzioni, supra note 115.  
 128. Logan, supra note 82, at 256 (explaining that PSI states try to deter rogue states 
and terrorist groups by making it more expensive to proliferate and requiring greater time 
and effort to create a WMD). 
 129. See Gawdat Bahgat, Nonproliferation Success: The Libyan Model, WORLD 
AFFAIRS, June 22, 2005, at 3, 5. 
 130. Allen, supra note 7, at 61. 
 131. Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (explaining that in the absence of formal legal 
responsibilities, PSI member states frequently confer to trade information, strategize, 
conduct training exercises, and coordinate and develop legal authorities). 
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proliferation actions of states acting in their individual capacities or in 
conjunction with each other.132  Thus, by harmonizing international 
standards and encouraging individual state responsibilities toward 
proliferation, the PSI, NSG, and Australia Group strengthen the NPT and 
similar treaties by making it more difficult for a responsible state to 
unwittingly export WMD components to a rogue state.133  
However, there is one important difference. The NSG and Australia 
Group focus on export controls, whereas the PSI focuses on actually 
stopping proliferators.134  Although each makes proliferation more 
difficult, only the PSI can physically stop proliferation.135 Accordingly, 
because the other regimes basically consist of only information sharing, 
the PSI adds a helpful element of force to what would otherwise be a set 
of voluntary treaties supported only by voluntary export controls.136 
As a result, voluntary enforcement agreements may appear to already 
address the limitations of the preexisting regimes.137  However, the 
problem is that the legal effect of the agreements is limited to signatory 
states, which are already inclined not to develop or assist in the 
development of WMD for rogue purposes.138  In this sense, it is similar 
                                            
 132. Id. at 151 (arguing that “while the PSI gives the impression of free-form 
multilateralism through its decentralized operating structure, the ‘arrangement’ is more 
accurately understood as a mechanism through which the unilateral actions of 
participating states can be coordinated and facilitated”). 
 133. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Proliferation Security Initiative: The Legacy of Operacion 
Socotora, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 991, 1013 (Spring 2007) (explaining 
that such frameworks sometimes include a political obligation to prohibit or prevent 
illegal activities under a state’s laws). 
 134. Bolton, supra note 22, at 400 (explaining that PSI activities are carried out by the 
military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, whereas the NSG and Australia 
Group are diplomatic efforts).  
 135. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 410 (explaining that the interdiction process 
may involve intelligence sharing, tracking a vessel, stopping it, and boarding it). 
 136. Logan, supra note 82, at 270 (noting that because the PSI involves preemption 
action that such an action may be justified by how great a threat the WMD poses to the 
interdicting state).  
 137. Abe, supra note 124, at 931 (noting that the NSG addresses some of the 
weaknesses of the NPT by instituting export controls). 
 138. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (noting that when the non-signatory state of North 
Korea withdrew from the NPT, it was no longer illegal for it to export its nuclear 
materials). Because of its withdrawal, North Korea could theoretically export a nuclear 
weapon to another state without either state violating the NPT or international law.  Id.  
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to a group of law-abiding people who would never even commit a crime 
in the first place agreeing not to commit or assist in a crime.139  
In regard to the use of anti-proliferation resources for universal 
interdiction, neither the PSI nor NPT’s text supports the deputizing of 
any state to combat proliferation.140  Instead, such ideas are left to their 
critics.141  For instance, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the 
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, proposes that WMD 
proliferation should be a crime akin to piracy or slavery.142  He suggests 
that “trade in weapons of mass destruction would make one an outlaw—
i.e., subject to the enforcing action of any law-abiding citizen.”143  
However, absent such a proposal being instituted, the NPT, its sister 
agreements, and the enforcement regimes provide little justification for 
expanding universal jurisdiction.   
In sum, the PSI’s relation to the existing anti-proliferation regime is 
akin to an added tool.144  Although it is not a legal extension of the NPT 
or CWC, it serves as a useful addition that can make proliferation harder. 
145  It does so by, first, making it more difficult to supply a WMD or its 
component parts to a rogue state and, second, by decreasing the amount 
of states that will knowingly facilitate such a transfer.146 Taken by itself, 
however, the PSI does not address the non-PSI country to non-PSI 
country transfer hypothetical discussed above because such an 
                                            
 139. Etzioni, supra note 115 (analogizing that the “difference between the NPT 
conception and that of deproliferation is akin to the difference between gun registration 
and removal of guns from private hands and most public ones”). 
 140. NPT, supra note 116, 21 U.S.T. at 485-87 (the text explicitly gives the IAEA with 
the power to deal with nuclear activities). 
 141. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (proposing that “[a]ny nation’s attempt to redeploy 
chemical, nuclear, or biological warheads outside of its borders or to ship the key means 
to make them should be deprived the protection of international law”); see also Treiger, 
supra note 121, at 257 (arguing that expanding the NPT to include the proposed universal 
jurisdiction offense of proliferating nuclear expertise could be a useful deterrent).  
 142. Sokolski, supra note 95, at 21 (arguing that an international anti-proliferation 
prohibition should be developed). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 407-10 (arguing that the PSI is an 
improvement over the preexisting system).  
 145. See James Timbie, A Nuclear Iran: The Legal Implications of a Preemptive 
National Security Strategy: Iran’s Nuclear Program, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 433, 441 
(2007) (explaining that, in the case of Iran, the PSI makes it more difficult to procure 
WMD materials). 
 146. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, supra note 7.  
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interdiction would be a unilateral exercise of power and would not be an 
act pursuant to the PSI’s text.147  
C. The United Nations Takes Positive Steps to Address Proliferation 
More than any other source, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (“1540”) expands universal jurisdiction.148  Unlike 
UNCLOS, it explicitly prohibits all states from helping non-state actors 
“develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”149  
Also, unlike the preexisting anti-proliferation regimes, it has the force of 
binding international law, which affects every state, rather than just the 
voluntary signatory states.150  Further, it imposes binding obligations on 
each state to legislate anti-proliferation controls for the purpose of 
promoting universal adherence to existing international nonproliferation 
treaties.151 
In addition, by requiring that all states prevent proliferation, 1540 
institutes a clear legal standard for the international system, one that goes 
further in its implications than any voluntary agreement (like the PSI) 
could do by itself.152  Indeed, its requirement that all states implement 
national anti-proliferation laws is, in effect, a demand that states act 
responsibly, and should they fail to do so, they may have to answer to the 
United Nations Security Council.153  Echoing this, John Bolton, the 
creator of the PSI,154 praised 1540 for “rest[ing] on the notion that 
                                            
 147. See NPT, supra note 116, 21 U.S.T. at 485-87 (showing that the NPT does not 
address enforcement outside of the IAEA).  
 148. See Allen, supra note 7, at 73, 75-76 (arguing that 1540 is a crucial part of the 
anti-proliferation regime because it imposes binding obligations on all states). 
 149. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 75, ¶ 1 (noting that this applies under the United 
Nation’s Chapter VII power). 
 150. Counter-Proliferation in Asia: No Place to Hide, Maybe, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
30, 2004, at 43, 43 (noting that though signatories to the NPT, CWC, and BWC are 
required to institute such laws, that they have not and that 1540 may be the impetus to 
pass laws regulating “weapons materials and delivery systems”). 
 151. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/sc/1540/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).  
 152. See Allen, supra note 7, at 76 (arguing that the message of 1540 is that all states 
must do their part to fight proliferation). 
 153. See Byers, supra note 28 (explaining that the United Nations Security Council 
reserved the power to act in itself). 
 154. Logan, supra note 83, at 265 (explaining that Bolton’s goal was for the PSI to 
“shut down” proliferation). 
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sovereign states are responsible for writing and implementing laws 
closing the loopholes exploited by black market WMD networks.”155 
However, though the State Department describes 1540 and the PSI as 
consistent and reinforcing, there is debate about whether, if they are 
compatible, the PSI is more far-reaching than 1540.156  For instance, 
though all states are required to develop and maintain export controls, the 
states are only called upon “[t]o promote the . . . strengthening of 
multilateral treaties to which they are parties . . . .”157  This clause, by 
being a recommendation, seems like it is only a reaffirmation of the 
voluntary obligations of a signatory state to the NPT rather than a new 
obligation to abide by the PSI or any other anti-proliferation 
framework.158  
In addition, the resolution is notable for what it does not sanction.  
First, the president of the United Nations Security Council’s states that if 
1540 were violated, then other states were not authorized to unilaterally 
enforce it.159  Rather the United Nations Security Council as a whole 
should answer any question about enforcement.160  Second, in drafting 
the resolution, a provision that would have explicitly authorized PSI-
style activities was stricken in favor of a more general recommendation 
that states work together in anti-proliferation efforts.161  Both examples 
seem to narrow the resolution’s power and to only endorse the PSI 
insofar as it operates within the multilateral, bureaucratic system that it 
sought to avoid.162 
                                            
 155. Bolton, supra note 80. 
 156. See Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 28 
(explaining that both the PSI and 1540 seek to strengthen national laws regarding anti-
proliferation); see also Byers, supra note 27, at 532 (arguing that the “recommendatory 
nature of [1540’s prevention] provision indicates, together with the references to 
international law, an absence of any authorization to exceed the existing rules”). 
 157. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Decides All States Shall Act to 
Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons, U.N. Press Release SC/8076 (Apr. 8, 
2004), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm. 
 158. See Byers, supra note 27, at 532 (noting that parts of the resolution are limited in 
what they require of states).  
 159. Allen, supra note 7, at 76 (noting that in matters of unilateral enforcement that 
only the United Nations Security Council has the prerogative to act). 
 160. See id. 
 161. Becker, supra note 1, at 166-67 (describing the successful Chinese effort to 
remove an explicit PSI-style authorization, possibly out of fear that such an authorization 
could set an interdiction precedent that might disrupt China’s commercial shipping 
interests in the future). 
 162. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409 (explaining that the United States 
viewed the United Nations as unreliable and inadequate to deal with novel challenges, 
which necessitated an organization that would act outside the United Nations). 
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In some sense, this is probably an unavoidable situation.  By 
operating as a voluntary partnership, the PSI has the luxury of setting its 
own rules and avoiding the legalisms of the international system.163  But 
by its very nature, such a partnership can only have a universal impact if 
the vast majority of states are party to it or if it is ratified by the United 
Nations.164  Accordingly, in the matter of whether a state can interdict a 
vessel on the high seas that it reasonably suspects of transporting WMD, 
for now it seems that it is a choice of whether to act unilaterally and 
outside the international system or 1540.165  In such a case, John Bolton 
suggests:  
Where there are gaps or ambiguities in our authorities, we may 
consider seeking additional sources for such authority, as 
circumstances dictate. What we do not believe, however, is that 
only the Security Council can grant the authority we need, and 
that may be the real source of the criticism we face.166 
Given the uncertainty of WMD interdiction, such ambiguity is 
especially unfortunate.167  After all, perhaps the most important reason 
why proliferation is such a challenging issue is the fact that about 95 
percent of WMD components are dual-use materials, meaning that they 
themselves can be subject to interpretation.168  Therefore, when one state 
is trying to determine whether to interdict a vessel from another state, it 
must make two decisions: (1) whether its information is good enough to 
reasonably suspect that the target materials are illegal and (2) whether it 
should bear the risk of running afoul of international law if the vessel’s 
                                            
 163. See Becker, supra note 1, at 165-67 (arguing that the PSI is essentially a system 
that facilitates unilateral enforcement actions). 
 164. Id. at 155 (contrasting adherence to treaties and United Nations resolutions). 
 165. Id. 
 166. John R. Bolton, “Legitimacy” in International Affairs: The American Perspective 
in Theory and Operation, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 13, 2013), http://www. 
state.gov/t/us/rm/26143.htm; see also Christopher Kremmer, High Stakes on the High 
Seas in Korean Blockade, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 12, 2003), 
http://www.smh.com.au/cgi-bin/common/popupPrintArticle.pl?path=/articles/2003/07/ 
11/1057783354653.html (citing John Bolton as having argued that self-defense is 
sufficient to justify a high-seas interdiction). 
 167. See supra Part II.C (noting that Iran and Iraq acquired many parts to build WMD 
by procuring dual-use items through the exploitation of legitimate trade channels).  
 168. See Logan, supra 82, at 259. “The effort to interdict the rare illicit shipment may 
require the coastal state to stop and search numerous ships which turn out to pose no 
threat at all. And further, even if questionable materials are found, the coastal state must 
then prove that the materials will be used for threatening rather than non-threatening 
purposes.”  Id. 
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contents are perfectly legal.169  Accordingly, the fact that 1540 is limited 
in its scope and that a vessel’s contents may be subject to interpretation 
create a situation in which the only thing that a vessel proliferating 
WMD on the high seas has to fear is a hostile state that makes the bold, 
risky, and illegal move of unilaterally interdicting it.170  In sum, while 
1540 makes definite strides toward universalizing anti-proliferation 
efforts, it falls short of fully addressing proliferation on the high seas.171  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It should by now be clear that the PSI suffers from two limitations.  
First, despite its many signatories, a determined rogue state or group can 
flout its strictures by simply being a non-PSI member that complies with 
international law.172  Second, without the support of more nations, it will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to establish WMD interdiction either as a 
core principle of customary international law or of United Nations-
backed international law.173  Without addressing these limitations, the 
PSI will simply be another anti-proliferation tool rather than an initiative 
that closes the loopholes of the anti-proliferation system.  The following 
are three recommendations aimed at fixing the PSI’s limitations. 
A. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded  
Through the United Nations 
Despite its occasional aversion to international law, the United States 
often looks to international law to justify its actions, solve its problems, 
or maintain its security.174  For instance, in the run-up to the Iraq war, the 
                                            
 169. See id. (explaining that the interdictor would have to show that the United Nations 
makes transporting WMD illegal and that the transport is itself a danger); see also 
Becker, supra note 1, at 149 (noting that dual-use materials must be clearly described to 
prevent legitimate materials from being seized). 
 170. See infra Part IV.C (discussing preemptive attacks). 
 171. See Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (stating that “it is not clear that the PSI has 
effectively created a global consensus on acceptable standards and procedures for 
counter-proliferation interdiction operations at sea”). 
 172. Id. at 155 (explaining that anti-proliferation efforts are only as powerful as the 
states that comply with them).  
 173. See Allen, supra note 7, 58-62 (discussing the limitations of non-universal 
compliance with the PSI). 
 174. See William H. Taft, IV, A View From the Top: American Perspectives on 
International Law After the Cold War, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 503, 503-04 (2006) (arguing 
that since the end of the Second World War, the United States employed international 
law to its benefit in military alliances, trade, science, environment, and human rights). 
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Bush administration made its case at the United Nations.175  There, the 
United States argued that because Iraq had violated United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions, the United Nations or, failing that, a 
member state, had to take action to enforce the resolutions.176  Similarly, 
even though it is not party to UNCLOS, the United States benefits from 
customary international law because international law ensures the 
legality of both the mobility of the United States’ armed forces and the 
merchant vessels that travel to and from the country’s shores.177 
To some, by going to the United Nations Security Council and 
obtaining a new resolution, a state would, on the one hand, benefit from a 
universal law but could, on the other hand, be hindered by another state’s 
veto.178  In this sense, going to the United Nations might be an 
anachronistic gesture more appropriate to the Cold War.179  Such 
criticism may be misplaced. 
Going to the United Nations to expand universal jurisdiction is a 
natural extension of past efforts to strengthen and act in accord with the 
international system.180  The problem with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, as detailed above, is that, though it mandates 
that states close loopholes to proliferation, it does not give express 
authorization to high seas interdictions.181  A new United Nations 
resolution (or amendment to 1540) that explicitly backs the PSI and 
delineates specific circumstances in which a state can interdict another 
                                            
 175. See Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security 
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 404-05 (2004). 
 176. See David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Virtues of Preemptive Deterrence, 29 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 85, 100-02 & n. 36 (Fall 2005) (arguing that “aside from the legality of 
preemption, the Iraq war was perhaps the most legally justified war of all time”); but see 
Nagan and Hammer, supra note 175, at 413-17 (arguing that the Bush administration’s 
reliance on United Nations Security Council resolutions owed more to tendentious 
interpretations of the text as opposed to a solid legal basis for the use of force). 
 177. See Byers, supra note 27, at 527 (explaining that the United States’ decision to 
release the So San demonstrated the seriousness with which it regards UNCLOS). 
 178. See Yoo & Sulmasy, supra note 8, at 409-10 (arguing that the United States 
created the PSI, in part, because the Security Council was unreliable and would possibly 
veto the initiative). 
 179. Id. (arguing that, in the past, the United Nations was unfit to deal with new 
challenges to international order). 
 180. Taft, supra note 174, at 505 (noting that the United States “enthusiastically 
supported the development of new international legal obligations” in the Security 
Council). 
 181. Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (explaining that China’s successful effort to prevent 
PSI-style interdictions from being expressly authorized frustrated the development of 
customary international law to include such interdictions). 
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state’s vessel would improve 1540 by closing the high seas gap.182  In 
addition, unlike other methods of creating international law, such as 
through treaties or the development of international norms, it would 
quickly institute what would otherwise take years to put in place.183  For 
these reasons, a United Nations resolution may be the best way to 
quickly and effectively expand universal jurisdiction. 
B. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded By  
Increased PSI Membership 
As shown by the obstacles to getting an explicit authorization from 
the United Nations for PSI-style interdictions, it may be more realistic to 
expand universal jurisdiction through increasing membership in the PSI 
and thereby developing customary international law.184  Although it will 
not initially bear the imprimatur and authority of international law, the 
practice of interdiction combined with increasing the number of PSI 
members will strengthen anti-proliferation efforts by decreasing the 
amount of states that tacitly permit proliferators to travel the seas 
unmolested and by increasing the costs of transporting WMD.185 
History provides at least one analogous example for this type of 
action.  In the early 19th century, the British started suppressing the 
transatlantic slave trade through a campaign that employed both 
diplomacy and unilateral action.186  At first, the efforts consisted of 
unilateral boarding and bilateral interdiction treaties between Britain and 
                                            
 182. Id. (noting that a new right of interdiction is unlikely to develop out of customary 
international law without a Security Council authorization). 
 183. Id. (explaining that developing international customary law is made even more 
difficult when based off of treaties due to the exceptions that states incorporate into 
treaties as a condition for signing them). 
 184. See Barry, supra note 9, at 330.  “Like the crimes of piracy and slavery, the near 
universal condemnation of the transfer of WMD, as evidenced by specific multilateral 
treaties, could indicate that a new principle of jus cogens is being formulated, creating a 
universal jurisdiction over the act.”  Id. 
 185. See Sharp, supra note 133, at 1026 (proposing that PSI states announce the state 
and non-state actors with which they are concerned, which could make proliferation more 
difficult by increasing its costs and reducing the number of otherwise friendly states); see 
also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 91, at 1119 (explaining that customary international 
law develops over time due to changes in power, technology, and other factors, as when 
coastal jurisdiction increased from the three-mile cannon-shot rule to the present twelve-
mile rule). 
 186. See Byers, supra note 27, at 534-36 (arguing that moral and economic reasons 
explain how Britain went from being a player in the slave trade to the primary proponent 
of abolition). 
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other states.187  As the campaign went on, multilateral treaties and an 
enforcement regime supplemented the earlier strategies.188  Through 
these efforts, by the end of the 19th century, Britain, along with other 
states, formed a “near universal” consensus against the slave trade.189 
As with the British and the slave trade, there already exists a 
consensus of sorts against proliferating WMD in the form of the various 
anti-proliferation efforts.190  Perhaps by extension, the wrong that is 
thwarted by searching a ship of one hundred slaves can also justify 
searching a vessel that contains either a weapon or parts of a weapon that 
can kill thousands.191  Accordingly, should universal jurisdiction not be 
expanded through the United Nations, building upon the existing 
consensus against proliferation and increasing membership in the PSI 
may be the next best option. 
C. Universal Jurisdiction Should Be Expanded Unilaterally 
With all this in mind, some states may not want to take the risk of 
operating through the international system and may instead decide to act 
unilaterally.192  Under these circumstances, if a state feels threatened by a 
vessel that it reasonably suspects of carrying WMD, it may conclude that 
it should unilaterally interdict a vessel regardless of the condemnations 
and criticisms which may accompany such an act.193  In a sense, it is 
breaking one law in order to prevent another law from being broken.  
                                            
 187. Barry, supra note 9, at 315 (explaining that Britain’s initial unilateral actions set 
in motion the abolition of transatlantic slavery). 
 188. Becker, supra note 1, at 208 (explaining that the British used multiple tactics 
toward the goal of abolishing slavery). 
 189. Barry, supra note 9, at 315 (explaining that the customary international law 
against slavery came about because Britain was the only nation that had the capability 
and will to unilaterally prohibit it). 
 190. Becker, supra note 1, at 167 (showing that the goal of nonproliferation is widely 
shared, if not the means to achieve the goal); see also Barry, supra note 9, at 330 (arguing 
that due to the widespread condemnation of proliferation, it follows that there may 
already be authority to justify stopping proliferation on the high seas). 
 191. See Helfman, supra note 102, at 1153 (explaining that one prominent slavery 
abolitionist, using similar logic, argued that slave traders were equivalent to pirates, 
which therefore gave the British a license to stop the trade); see also Langewiesche, 
supra note 3 (describing the impact of a nuclear bomb). 
 192. See Becker, supra note 1, at 229 (conceding that “if the United States and its PSI 
allies suspect that a vessel is transporting a WMD shipment at sea, they are going to 
act”). 
 193. Id. at 230 (arguing that non-interference in foreign affairs can be a good tool for 
promoting peace and security, but that it is not an end in itself). 
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Although this might do short-term damage to the authority of 
international law, it will also illustrate how serious states are about 
ending proliferation, even if it means acting extralegally.194  More 
importantly, it will show that anti-proliferation regimes are not just dead 
letters.  Such a showing could, in turn, lead to the practice of interdicting 
proliferating vessels becoming customary international law.195  
V. CONCLUSION 
Even though the PSI is a useful tool in deterring and stopping the 
proliferation of WMD, it does not do enough to address proliferation on 
the high seas.  Due to the voluntary nature of the PSI, its shortcomings 
are a reflection of factors that are out of its control.  One such factor is 
the unwillingness of other states to use the United Nations to form a 
more aggressive anti-proliferation framework.  Therefore, in response to 
the current limitations of international law in combating WMD 
proliferation, states should expand the doctrine of universal jurisdiction 
to include WMD interdiction through the United Nations, by increasing 
membership in the PSI, or by unilateral action.  Such an expansion will 
make the world a safer place by increasing the costs of proliferation and 
emphasizing the seriousness with which responsible states regard WMD 
proliferation. 
  
                                            
 194.  See Barry, supra note 9, at 322-23 (explaining that Israel’s preemptive attacks 
against hostile Arab states in the Six Day War and Iraq’s nuclear program bolstered the 
case for anticipatory self-defense by proportionately attacking an imminent threat); see 
also Becker, supra note 1, at 209 (noting that even after an adverse court ruling, the 
British continued to interdict slave vessels and regard slave trading as a universal 
offense).  
 195. But see Becker, supra note 1, at 229-30 (arguing that even though a state may be 
justified in acting unilaterally, the costs of such action will be more easily borne if done 
with the blessing of the international community). 
